The design of reward packages for main board directors is a crucial strategic decision for firms, that impinges on the quality of all other strategic decisions. The aim of this paper is to investigate and assess the implications of current practice among large UK companies in relation to the award of annual bonuses to senior executives. There is a long and well documented tradition of empirical enquiry into many aspects of executive remuneration, but much of this has focused on the relationship between the total pay packages of senior executives and firm performance, plus a range of firm level variables such as size and governance characteristics 1 .
A subsidiary strand of research, starting with Jensen and Murphy 2 , has sought to isolate the effect of particular elements of pay on this type of relationship. In this context, it is perhaps surprising that one of the most established elements of executive reward, the annual bonus, has received very limited attention. This paper seeks to address this omission by examining contemporary practice in relation to the rationale for bonus awards, the size of awards in absolute and relative terms, the impact of bonus on the pay-performance relationship and the transparency of practice in relation to bonus payments. This research offers a timely insight into bonus practices against a backdrop of considerable contemporary disquiet within policymaking and stakeholder communities in the UK regarding the terms of senior executives' contracts and their role in influencing the quality of corporate governance.
Although this paper focuses on short term (annual) executive bonus, repeat doses of bonus have long term implications, and the following analysis to a large extent mirrors the treatment of long term incentives in the literature. It is organised as 1 follows. Section 1 offers a selective overview of the executive compensation literature. Section 2 outlines some general features of the architecture of executive remuneration in modern UK firms, accounts for the relative absence of bonus-related research and identifies specific research questions. Section 3 derives hypotheses concerning the links between executive bonus pay and firm performance, Section 4 describes the methodology and data which offer insights into current UK practice, and Section 5 offers an interpretation of the results of the application of this methodology to the data. Some concluding remarks and suggestions for extensions to this area of research follow.
Previous Studies
There is a long tradition of empirical investigation into aspects of executive remuneration, particularly in the USA. At the risk of oversimplification, much of the earlier material in this area sought to explore the relationship between total executive pay, variously measured, and a range of firm-level (normally financial) performance variables, such as turnover, market and/or accounting performance. Prior to this study, estimates of both pay sensitivity and elasticity (see Table 1 ) for the UK produced results rather lower than those observed in the USA. Thus, for salary, bonus and ESOs, Conyon and Murphy 10 calculate a sensitivity of 2.33 compared with 6.00 for the USA 11 , whilst elasticity in the UK (0.121) bore a similar relation to elasticity in the USA (0.39) in these studies.
Ironically, when comprehensive valuations of LTIPs were estimated for the UK 12 , it was found that LTIPs (embodying performance conditions that were supposed to increase sensitivity) were associated with the opposite effect, with sensitivity as low as 1.55. Such an outcome is not inconsistent with self-serving executives designing soft LTIP performance conditions for themselves that weakened the performance-pay link.
A clue to this phenomenon is provided by the title of the DTI Consultative Document "Reward for Failure?" 13 . There is some suggestion here that the opaqueness of LTIP , discussed later in respect to executive bonuses. Whether or not the detail of scheme design represents a wilful attempt to frustrate effective shareholder scrutiny of pay arrangements, it may be argued that scheme complexity fails to offer a clear incentive to eligible executives in the sense that incentives need to be transparent in order to be effective.
The degree of attention afforded to the scrutiny of such stock-based compensation,
and ESOs in particular, in the last twenty years is in stark contrast to that given to the scrutiny of annual bonuses. It is a contention of this paper that this unevenness should be addressed, particularly as in recent times UK companies have found stock-based compensation a less useful and attractive tool for rewarding executives, given the unfavourable performance of equity markets. Now, there is at least a suspicion that they may be turning instead to the annual bonus as a source of softer rewards.
Bonuses were, of course, an element of UK pay practice long before recent anxieties regarding corporate governance arrangements in UK companies became an issue, but equally there has often been a tolerance of bonuses as a less transparent form of reward than long term incentives. It has been argued, for example, that it is entirely 6 appropriate for annual bonus to be based on individual, confidential terms that are related to measures of internal performance at an individual, divisional or company level. For example, "Individual Performance Evaluation" is fashionable in the USA, where some discretion is left to the Board over the amount of bonus paid. This applies to around 42% of the CEO bonuses of large firms in the USA 17 .
Probably as a result of arguments citing the sensitive commercial nature of bonus targets, the regulation of bonuses has been relatively weak in the UK. Thus, the 2003
Combined Code 18 bundles annual bonuses together with other performance-related forms of pay, and states that all incentives should be subject to "challenging performance conditions", and "performance conditions should be relevant, stretching and designed to enhance the business". However, no detailed regulations exist specifically for bonus performance conditions.
Whatever the relative merits of undisclosed targets or bonus targets which are transparent to shareholders, however, an agency perspective would suggest that any changes to bonus schemes in terms of the form of payment (cash or shares) or more transparent performance targets should be expected to raise pay-performance sensitivity without necessarily raising pay-outs. Greater transparency may be expected to expose executives to more shareholder supervision, providing another incentive for CEOs to act in the interest of shareholders, again raising pay-performance sensitivity.
Clearly, however, this relative lack of regulation and transparency offers at least the opportunity for levels of individual reward that might otherwise attract concern or criticism and is this also forms part of the case for more detailed academic enquiry. In line with the literature on long-term incentives, the focus here is on any links between executive bonus payments and firm performance.
Hypotheses
In developing hypotheses that might offer an insight into the contemporary impact of bonus payments to UK executives, it is instructive to consider alternative theoretical perspectives on executive pay which give rise to expectations of distinct empirical However, a rather different perspective assigns a more significant role to managerial power as an influence on the design of executive pay. Here, the exercise of power would be evidenced by managerial rent extraction at the expense of principals, resulting in weak alignment between pay and firm performance and by levels of executive reward which are resilient to periods of poor corporate performance 22 .
It should be noted that, whilst these competing agency and managerial power perspectives are frequently characterised as representing quite distinct views on corporate governance, agency theorists would tend to view managerial power as no more than a special case of the agency relation, which is likely to apply where governance institutions and processes are weak. For the purposes of this paper, however, whether or not the managerial power perspective is seen as a variant of agency is not an issue.
In terms of aggregate bonus payments and performance, the agency perspective forms the basis of our first hypothesis, while a managerial power approach would suggest its negation: well as shareholder groups and the media. In particular, there is a perception that scheme award criteria may be motivated principally by executive power and a desire to achieve higher levels of effectively guaranteed payments. From the power and agency perspectives, excess rents associated with guaranteed income schemes camouflaged as bonus schemes (without transparency) are unlikely to provide executives with the incentives needed to raise firm performance. Thus:
H3: Transparency in bonus schemes (however measured) will be negatively associated with bonus pay-outs.

Data and Methodology
Data on CEO rewards, firm performance in terms of shareholders' return and control This two-year panel of data enabled two cross-section analyses to be employed. A reliable measure of performance-bonus sensitivity requires estimation of the average performance-bonus relationship across two moments in time.
Bonus schemes were classified according to the types of targets used, see Table 2 .
INSERT In addition to these regressions concerning firm performance and executive bonus, the database was used to produce descriptive results that cast light on H2. Firms in the finance sector clearly show a tendency towards higher cash pay, after allowing for performance. Similarly, firms with non-British CEOs seem to offer a cash pay premium, but only in our second year. Unusually, firm size is insignificant throughout, and this contrasts with its significance in all earlier studies 24 . However, these studies addressed total pay (including option valuations) or cash pay (salary plus bonus) and no previous study focused exclusively on bonus. It would appear that bonus is one element of CEO pay which is not rigidly linked to firm size, offering more potential for influence from performance. (In this study, the transformation of the bonus variable employed eliminates the influence of size on bonus pay.)
Results
Generally, the regressions provide consistent support for H1, the influence of firm performance and the agency theory that underpins it. Both measures of firm performance (EPS and TSR) are shown to be positively and significantly associated with bonus pay. In order to compare directly the responsiveness of bonus pay to the results for other countries and periods cited in Table 1 , the coefficients on TSR in Table 4 were converted into sensitivities and elasticities (see footnotes to Table 1 ).
Given the magnitude of shareholder value (with the median firm's market capitalisation of £1.446 billion in 2002/03) and CEO pay, it has been observed that sensitivities (the absolute increase in CEO pay associated with a £1,000 increase in shareholder value) are bound to be low. In the case of this study, a £1,000 increase in shareholder value is associated with a median 2.12 pence increase in CEO pay, which yields a quite low pay-performance sensitivity of 0.0212. This corresponds with the 0.0135 sensitivity calculated by Jensen and Murphy (1990) for salary and bonus, see Table 1 .
As noted above, these quite trivial sensitivities (as a result of the shareholder value and executive bonus magnitudes) suggest that a relative rather than an absolute measure of responsiveness may be more enlightening. Pay-performance elasticities were therefore calculated, representing the percentage change in CEO pay associated with a percentage change in shareholder value. Over the two years, a 10% change in TSR was associated with a 2.19% increase in bonus, i.e. an elasticity of 0.219. It can be seen from Table 1 The relations between the characteristics of bonus schemes are complex, but the picture emerges of an increasingly polarisation in forms of bonus package.
INSERT TABLE 5 NEAR HERE
For example, Table 5 shows that in 2001/02, 81 CEOs had a single performance target, and that in 57 of these cases, the single target was a published one. As the number of targets increases, they are less likely to be published. However, this apparent support for agency theory should be viewed with caution.
While bonus simplicity is associated positively with performance, it would appear that detailed bonus scheme characteristics are generally insensitive to this relationship.
Bonus schemes in the UK continue to become more complex in terms of the use of multiple targets. There appears to be a trend towards abandonment of simple schemes with unpublished targets in favour of schemes with more targets, and unpublished ones at that.
Of course "Individual Performance Evaluation", where Boards have some discretion over the amount of bonus paid against unpublished or undisclosed targets, may succeed in theory, especially where the nature of the business makes it advisable to keep CEO targets confidential. Nevertheless, the implication of this paper is that, on balance, transparency in the form of simplicity (and associated published targets)
generates the best results.
Future research may do well to focus on the long term tracking of bonus schemes against performance, particularly those that have been subjected to change. Of course, more than two cross-sections of data are needed for this task, and this is a substantial weakness of this paper. At the same time, another year of data requires about one researcher-year of data retrieval and inputting.
with many other components of executive pay, the "devil may be in the detail", and trends in the particular architecture of schemes may prove to be at least as important as aggregate relationships. 1 Performance-Pay Sensitivity shows the absolute increment to pay associated with a 1,000 unit (e.g. $) increase in shareholder value, so a sensitivity of 0.0135 (for salary and bonus, denotes that an additional $1,000 of shareholder value is associated with a 1.35 cents of additional executive pay. It is calculated by regressing changes in executive pay on changes in shareholder value.
2 Performance-Pay Elasticity shows the % responsiveness of pay to a % change in performance. For example, an elasticity of 0.10 denotes that a CEO associated with a 20% rate of return would be paid 1% more than a CEO associated with 10% (Hall and Liebman, 1998, p 654). It is calculated by regressing the change in the log of executive pay on change in the log of shareholder value. 
